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Weather is a key source of income risk for many firms and households, 
particularly in emerging market economies. This paper studies how an 
innovative risk management instrument for hedging rainfall risk affects 
production decisions among a sample of Indian agricultural firms, 
using a randomized controlled trial approach. We find that the 
provision of insurance induces farmers to shift production towards 
higher-return but higher-risk cash crops, particularly amongst more-
educated farmers. Our results support the view that financial innovation 
may help mitigate the real effects of uninsured production risk. In a 
second experiment we elicit willingness to pay for insurance policies 
that differ in their contract terms, using the Becker-DeGroot-Marshak 
mechanism. Willingness-to-pay is increasing in the actuarial value of 
the insurance, but substantially less than one-for-one, suggesting that 
farmers’ valuations are inconsistent with a fully rational benchmark.  
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Risk management and insurance is a key function of the global financial system, and 
a source of significant financial innovation in recent decades.
1 This paper studies how access 
to an innovative retail risk management instrument influences “real” production decisions. 
We focus on a sample of small agricultural firms in a semi-arid region of India, a setting in 
which rainfall variability during the monsoon is the primary source of production and income 
risk. We employ a field experiment approach: a randomly selected treatment group of 
farmers are provided with a significant quantity of rainfall index insurance at the start of the 
monsoon, mitigating their exposure to rainfall risk. We then study how this insurance 
provision influences subsequent production decisions (relative to a control group), such as 
crop choice and usage of agricultural inputs. 
Our empirical analysis relates to a large theoretical literature on the link between 
incomplete markets and production decisions. In an idealized setting with complete risk-
sharing, production and investment are decoupled from non-systematic income risk. Firms 
simply invest whenever the net present value of an investment (measured using an economy-
wide aggregate pricing kernel) is positive. Non-systematic risk is generally expected to 
influence production decisions when markets are incomplete, however (e.g. Froot and Stein, 
1998; Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993; Bodie, Merton and Samuelson, 1992; Gollier and 
Pratt, 1996). One prediction of theory is that firms or households subject to uninsurable 
idiosyncratic risk may shift towards lower-risk, lower-return production activities; this 
response is dubbed “income smoothing” by Morduch (1995). Firms may also favor 
production activities whose returns covary negatively (or less positively) with the sources of 
uninsurable risk (Froot and Stein, 1998). 
We test these theoretical predictions amongst a sample of agricultural firms facing a 
specific source of exogenous, non-systematic production risk -- variation in local rainfall 
during the monsoon season. Rainfall is cited as the most important source of risk by 89% of 
our sample. These local rainfall shocks are, to a first approximation, non-systematic: they are 
                                                 
1 For example, there has been enormous growth in the size and scope of the market for financial derivatives (e.g. 
credit default swaps, commodity futures, interest rate swaps etc.) used by firms to manage market and credit risk. A 
second example is the development of the “catastrophe” bond market, that allow for automatic principal forgiveness 
following the occurrence of a pre-specified set of catastrophe events, such as a hurricane or flood. Securitization is 
also motivated in large part by the desire to diversify risk. 2 
 
approximately uncorrelated with global aggregate asset returns. Because farmers have a non-
diversified exposure to local weather risk, however, rainfall shocks, and in particular 
drought, have significant and persistent effects on economic well-being and health for 
affected households, as shown in previous research studying India and other emerging 
market countries (e.g. Rose, 1999; Maccini and Yang, 2009; Jayachandran, 2006). 
Recognizing the importance of rainfall risk, a number of Indian insurers have in 
recent years developed innovative retail index insurance products designed to pay out when 
realized monsoon rainfall is poor. We study a particular policy developed by the private 
Indian insurer ICICI Lombard. Our analysis builds on a series of field experiments and 
surveys that we have conducted since 2004 in Andhra Pradesh, India (see Giné, Townsend 
and Vickery, 2008, and Cole et al. 2013). This previous work has focused on studying the 
determinants of the demand for rainfall insurance, rather than the impact of insurance on 
behavior. 
Identify the causal effects of insurance provision is typically difficult given that 
insurance takeup decisions are inevitably correlated with unobserved firm or household 
characteristics. For this reason, we use a randomized controlled trial (RCT) approach, in 
which insurance is randomized across farmers. At the start of the monsoon, half the farmers 
in our sample, the treatment group, were provided with 10 rainfall insurance policies, with a 
combined market value of approximately Rs. 1000 (equivalent to $20-$25 US). This is a 
significant amount of coverage for our sample; the maximum insurance payout of Rs. 10,000 
is equivalent to about 90% of reported median household savings. The control group was 
instead promised a fixed cash payment equal to an estimate of the actuarial value of the 
insurance policy (Rs. 350, or around $8 US) to be paid at the same time as insurance payouts. 
We then study differences in subsequent production decisions during the monsoon between 
these two groups. 
   We find that insurance provision has little effect on total agricultural investments, but 
causes significant shifts in the composition of those investments. In particular, treated 
households allocate more agricultural inputs (e.g. fertilizer, seeds, land) to the production of 
the main cash crops grown in the area, castor and groundnut. These two crops produce higher 3 
 
expected returns but are more sensitive to deficient rainfall. Insured farmers are more likely 
to plant cash crops, allocate a larger value of agricultural inputs to these two crops, and also 
plant more land with cash crops. Quantitatively, the fraction of farmers planting cash crops is 
6 percentage points higher for the treatment sample (p=0.041), or 12 percent (since about 
half of farmers planted cash crops in the monsoon season we study). 
Insurance provision has the greatest effect on production decisions amongst educated 
farmers, measured either by years of schooling, or an indicator variable for whether the 
farmer is literate. This heterogeneity by educational attainment is economically as well as 
statistically significant. Among literate farmers, assignment to the insurance treatment group 
increases the likelihood of investing in cash crops by 15 percentage points; among illiterate 
farmers, the treatment effect is indistinguishable from zero. We do not observe any 
corresponding heterogeneity by household wealth or landholdings. 
This empirical evidence is inconsistent with a full risk-sharing benchmark, but is 
consistent with the predictions of models in which production decisions are in part driven by 
risk management concerns (e.g. Froot and Stein, 1998). Our results relate to a large literature 
in development economics on the determinants of investment, growth and capital flows for 
emerging market economies. The “Green Revolution” introduced high-yield crop varieties, 
chemical fertilizer and other cultivation practices that tremendously increased global 
agricultural productivity. Yet, traditional farming practices still predominate in many areas, 
and take-up of new agricultural technologies remains limited, despite high expected rates of 
return (Duflo, Kremer and Robinson, 2008; Suri, 2009). Our results suggest that limited 
insurance against idiosyncratic production risk may be one explanation why firms in 
developing countries are unwilling to shift towards investments that generate higher returns, 
but with greater risk.
2 
                                                 
2 Our results are also related to literature of the effect of climate change on agricultural productivity. Guiteras (2009) 
uses historic rainfall variation to estimate the impact of weather on agricultural productivity, taking into account 
farmers’ endogenous risk-management strategies. He finds that predicted climate change from 2010-2039 will 
reduce major crop yields by 4.5 to 9 percent. While rainfall insurance cannot of course affect the climate, it may 
enable farmers to continue to produce risky crops in the face of increasing climate variability, lessening the real 
impact of climate change on productivity and incomes.   4 
 
Our findings also contribute to prior research on financial innovation and financial 
literacy. The risk management product we study represents an example of a new financial 
innovation targeted at retail-level customers. In recent years, academics and the public at 
large have emphasized the costs of financial innovation, associated with predatory behavior 
by financial intermediaries or mistakes by unsophisticated consumers (Agarwal et al., 2009, 
Campbell, 2006). We find that the provision of a risk management product with a relatively 
short payout history influences production behavior in the direction predicted by economic 
theory. The fact, however, that our results are substantially weaker for uneducated farmers 
may suggest that this group may either have less trust in the insurance product, or lower 
understanding of it.     
Our results also contribute to research in corporate finance studying the effects of 
firm risk management on investment decisions or firm value (e.g. Campello et al. 2011; 
Pérez-Gonzáles and Yun, 2011; Jin and Jorion, 2006; Allayanis and Weston, 2001). One 
contribution we make is to study a very different setting to this previous research, focusing 
on small private firms in an emerging market economy. Our RCT strategy also overcomes 
concerns that any identified relationships between risk management practices and firm 
outcomes may be driven by omitted variables or other endogeneity concerns. 
Two independent recent papers conduct field experiments that are closely related to 
ours. In India, Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2012) conduct a randomized evaluation which uses 
subsidies to induce households to purchase rainfall insurance: while their main interest is the 
interaction between insurance demand and informal risk-sharing, they also find evidence that 
insured households plant riskier varieties of rice. Karlan et al. (2012) randomly allocate cash 
grants, the opportunity to buy insurance, or both, to farmers in Ghana. They find that cash 
grants do not affect investment, but that the ability hedge rainfall does. Also related, Cai et 
al. (2012) finds evidence from China that hog insurance influences investment in hogs. 
The final section of this paper studies a second, related experiment, in which we elicit 
farmer willingness to pay for index insurance policies, to test the market viability of index 
insurance. We use an incentive-compatible Becker, DeGroot and Marschak (1964, hereafter 
BDM) mechanism, similar in spirit to a second-price auction, in which farmers bid on and 5 
 
actually purchase insurance policies. To our knowledge, this is one of the first 
implementations of the BDM mechanism in a field experiment setting. We find that on 
average, farmers’ valuation of the insurance policy exceeds our estimate of the actuarial 
price—this means that, if insurance were offered on terms roughly similar to retail insurance 
products (e.g. automobile insurance) in the United States, over half of our sample would 
purchase it. However, we also show that while farmers can identify changes in the contract 
that make the policies more or less valuable, they do less well at estimating the economic 
magnitude of these changes. An important implication of this result is that an insurer seeking 
to maximize short-term profits may be able to design a policy that appears valuable to 
consumers, but which does not in fact provide meaningful insurance. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We first motivate our experiment 
by discussing the theoretical underpinning of risk-coping strategies used by households in 
rural areas of developing countries use. Section 2 describes the rainfall insurance product in 
detail, and describes our experimental design. Section 3 describes the sample and presents 
summary statistics. Section 4 contains our main empirical results. Section 5 contains results 
from the willingness to pay elicitations. Section 6 summarizes and concludes. 
 
1. Theoretical considerations 
The main hypothesis tested in this paper is that the provision of insurance against 
income risk leads households to shift towards higher-return, higher-risk production activities. 
Below we review existing models and evidence on this research question. In the Appendix 
we also present a simple model illustrating our main prediction. 
A. The link between insurance arrangements and production decisions 
  In a setting where risk-pooling is incomplete, firms and households select among 
income-generating activities by considering both expected returns and the total volatility of 
returns. Literature on consumption insurance emphasizes the point that households can 
reduce consumption volatility both by ex post consumption smoothing (e.g. through 
borrowing and savings) and by ex ante income smoothing, that is, by selecting production 6 
 
activities that generate a less volatile income stream, generally at the cost of lower average 
income (Morduch, 1995; Gollier and Pratt, 1996; Walker and Ryan, 1990). Income 
smoothing and consumption smoothing are linked, in that better risk-coping mechanisms to 
insure consumption ex post will reduce the need for households to smooth income by 
selecting less risky activities ex ante. While consumption smoothing of income shocks has 
been shown to be surprisingly good in some settings (Townsend, 1994; Paxson, 1991), a 
substantial body of evidence suggests it is incomplete, especially for spatially covariate 
shocks like rainfall. See Cole et al. (2013) for further discussion and references. 
  Parallel theoretical research in corporate finance makes a corresponding prediction: a 
firm exposed to a nondiversifiable source of risk will invest less in risky production 
activities, in particular when the return on the risky activity is positively correlated with the 
existing risk exposure (Froot and Stein, 1998; Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993). The key 
difference in this setting is that aversion to income risk is driven by financial constraints, due 
to moral hazard, limited commitment or other frictions, rather than directly by the concavity 
of the utility function. In the context we study, consisting of mainly sole proprietor 
landowner farmers, incentives to manage production risk are likely to be driven by both 
household risk aversion and financial constraints. 
  For farmers, income smoothing strategies include intercropping of crops with 
different drought tolerances, spatial separation of plots, shifting the timing and staggering of 
planting, moisture conservation measures such as bunds, furrows and irrigation, and 
diversifying household income amongst agricultural and non-agricultural sources. A number 
of papers find suggestive evidence of income smoothing behavior by agricultural firms in 
developing countries (Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989; Morduch, 1995; Dercon, 1998; Dercon 
and Christiaensen, 2011).
3  
                                                 
3 Rosenzweig and Stark find that farmers with more volatile profits are more likely to have a household member 
engaged in steady wage employment. Morduch suggests that households whose consumption is close to subsistence 
devote a larger share of land to safer crop varieties. Dercon finds Tanzanian farmers with a large stock of liquid 
assets engage in higher risk agricultural activities. Dercon and Christiaensen find that fertilizer purchases are lower 
among poorer Ethiopean households, in part due to their lesser ability to smooth adverse shocks ex post. This 
behavior appears to significantly reduce average income. Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) estimate that a one 
standard deviation increase in the variability of monsoon onset would, through reduced risk-taking, reduce 7 
 
The ‘income smoothing’ hypothesis also implies that improved access to risk 
management instruments will have real effects on firm values and investment in risky 
production activities. Empirical research for large public US corporations finds evidence in 
support of this prediction. In particular, Pérez-Gonzáles and Yun (2011) find using US data 
that the introduction of weather derivatives increases investment and values for weather-
sensitive electric and gas firms, while Campello et al. (2011) find that hedging affects capital 
investment decisions and values for a larger sample of firms, making use of a tax-based 
instrument. We view the research question studied in these two papers as being closely 
connected to the development economics literature cited above, although the empirical 
setting is of course very different. 
  We contribute in at least two ways to this prior research on the link between 
production decisions and risk management or insurance arrangements. One, we consider an 
experimental setting, in which we enforce exogenous variation in access to insurance against 
income risk. This eliminates concerns about omitted variable biases or other identification 
issues, which may be a concern in some of the studies cited above. Two, we consider a 
particular mechanism for smoothing ex post income and consumption, namely a rainfall 
index insurance product. This innovative type of micro-insurance has recently drawn 
significant attention in developing countries (Giné et al., 2012). Our findings shed some light 
on how ongoing financial innovation in the micro-insurance sector may influence decision-
making by firms and households.
4 
B. A simple framework 
To help fix ideas, Appendix A presents a simple model of insurance and production 
decisions. Using comparative statics we illustrate our main prediction: improved availability 
of ex post insurance against production risk will lead to greater ex ante investment in risky 
production activities. The intuition is that for a risk-averse farmer, greater insurance makes 
                                                                                                                                                             
agricultural profits by 15 percent for their median household, and by 35 percent for a household at the 25th 
percentile of income. 
4 Our earlier research studies the determinants of rainfall insurance demand (Cole et al. 2009, Giné and Yang, 2009, 
and Giné et al., 2008). While we adopt a field experimental approach, generating random variation in insurance 
participation, uptake has been too limited to allow an assessment of its impact on real decisions. Also related, two 
noteworthy laboratory experiments conducted by Lybbert et al. (2010) and Hill and Visceisza (2009) suggest that, 
over time, subjects learn the benefits of insurance and capitalize on it. 8 
 
risky activities more attractive, by reducing the volatility of returns on such activities. While 
we consider a simple CARA-normal setup that yields a closed-form solution, this basic 
prediction is more general, will obtain in most models with risk-averse agents, incomplete 
markets and production risk. 
C. Crop choice decisions and risk-taking 
The model in Appendix A considers two production activities: one safe, the other 
higher-yielding but risky. Empirically, our analysis examines substitution across crop types 
with different exposures to rainfall risk. In particular, as well as measuring total production, 
we collected information from farmers about their allocation of agricultural inputs to the two 
main cash crops grown in our study areas, castor and groundnut. These crops are more 
rainfall-sensitive than most traditional subsistence crops but generate higher expected yields.  
During the main cropping season that runs from June to November farmers grow a 
variety of cash and subsistence crops that vary in terms of sensitivity to deficit rainfall. The 
main cash crops grown in the area are castor and groundnut, two rainfed oilseeds, as well as 
paddy, which is almost exclusively irrigated.
5 The main subsistence crops grown in the area 
are sorghum and grams (red gram or Pigeon peas and to a lesser extent green gram). 
Cultivation costs for the main cash crops are somewhat higher than those of 
subsistence crops and range between Rs 5,000 and Rs 9,000 per hectare ($94 to $168 US), if 
the recommended amounts of organic and inorganic fertilizer are applied.
6 Average yields 
for castor are 600 Kg per hectare if fertilizer is used amounting to Rs 10,896 using 2009 
prices.
7  Groundnut yields are 540 Kg per hectare with fertilizer corresponding to Rs 11,702. 
Sorghum yields with fertilizer are 700 Kg per hectare or Rs 4,788 and red gram yields are 
300 Kg or Rs 5,791. Thus, expected profits for castor and groundnut are indeed higher at Rs 
                                                 
5 Eighty four percent of all paddy plots in our sample use irrigation. 
6 Input recommendations come from the University of Agricultural Sciences in Bangalore (UAS, 1999).
  The 
production costs per hectare at 2009 prices for castor include Rs 1250 for seeds, Rs 1250 for manure, Rs 3,125 for 
fertilizer and Rs 2500 for labor expenses including labor, land preparation, sowing, weeding and harvesting. For 
groundnut, Rs 3125 for seeds, Rs 625 for manure, Rs 2500 for fertilizer and Rs 2500 for labor expenses. Sorghum 
production costs include Rs. 450 for seeds, Rs. 550 for manure, Rs 2000 for fertilizer and Rs. 2000 for labor. For red 
and green grams, Rs. 650 for seeds, Rs. 750 for manure, Rs. 1500 for fertilizer and Rs. 2750 for labor expenses.  
7 Data on crop prices come from the district Handbook of Statistics published by the Chief Planning Officer. 9 
 
2,771 and Rs 2,951 compared to a negative profit of Rs 212 for sorghum and a small profit of 
Rs 141 for red gram.
8 
In terms of water requirements, researchers at the Central Research Institute for 
Dryland Agriculture (CRIDA) estimate that castor grown in Mahbubnagar under rainfed 
conditions requires 625 mm of accumulated rainfall over the season if sown around the 
normal planting date while groundnut in Anantapur requires 533 mm. Red gram requires a 
similar amount of accumulated rainfall, 523 mm but in contrast, sorghum only requires 376 
mm and green gram 278 mm.
9  
  
2. Study design and data  
A. Product description 
  The rainfall insurance policies offered in this study are an example of “index 
insurance”, that is, a contract whose payouts are linked to a publicly observable index like 
rainfall, temperature or a commodity price. Unlike traditional insurance products, index 
insurance is not generally subject to moral hazard and adverse selection problems, because 
payouts are linked to an exogenous, publicly observable variable, in this case, rainfall 
measured at a local rain gauge. Index insurance also involves lower administrative costs, 
because no claims verification process is required. However, rainfall insurance only covers 
rainfall-related losses and may entail significant basis risk, especially if the household is 
located too far from the relevant weather reference station.
10  
  In part because insurance is typically bundled with credit at highly subsidized rates, 
index insurance markets are expanding in many emerging market economies (World Bank, 
2005; Skees, 2008). Today, rainfall insurance is offered by several firms and sold in many 
parts of India. Giné et al. (2012), Clarke et al. (2012) and Cole et al. (2013) provide non-
technical description of this market and further institutional details. 
                                                 
8 Although prices fluctuate year to year, expected profits will typically be larger for groundnut and castor. 
9 Based on personal communication from Dr. Bodapati Rao and Dr. Vijay Kumar, Principal Scientists at CRIDA. 
10 In our study, most villages are located within 10km of the reference weather station. Given the relatively flat 
terrain one may think that basis risk is likely to be relatively low, at least for our sample. However, we do not have 
hard data on the size of this risk. 10 
 
The policies we study are designed and underwritten by ICICI Lombard, a large 
Indian insurance firm. Payoffs are calculated based on measured rainfall at a nearby 
government rainfall station or an automated rain gauge operated by a private third-party 
vendor. ICICI Lombard policies divide the monsoon season into three contiguous phases of 
35-45 days, corresponding to sowing, flowering, and harvest.
11 The study offered only Phase 
I policies, which cover the first and most critical period of the season.  
Each insurance contract specifies a threshold amount of rainfall, designed to 
approximate the minimum required for successful crop growth. The date of the start of the 
policy is the first date at which cumulative total rainfall since June 1 is at least 50 mm. 
Payouts are then determined based on additional cumulative rainfall during the 35 days after 
the start date. The policy pays out if cumulative rainfall during the coverage period is below 
a threshold known as the “exit”. Payouts are linear in the rainfall deficit relative to the exit, 
or are equal to a fixed maximum amount of Rs. 1000 per policy if rainfall is below a second, 
lower threshold known as the “strike”.  
Farmers in our study received policies linked to one of five weather stations (see 
below for more details). Because 2009 monsoon turned out to be significantly below 
average, three of these five policies generated positive payouts ex post, with one of them 
paying out the maximum payout of Rs. 1,000. 
B. The insurance experiment 
  Our sample consists of 1,479 small agricultural firms drawn from 45 villages in two 
districts in Andhra Pradesh, Mahbubnagar and Anantapur. Many firms consist of a single 
family, although others hire labor. Two-thirds of the sample participated in previous research 
conducted by us on rainfall insurance; these were originally selected via a stratified random 
sample of land-owning farmers in 37 study villages in 2004 (see Giné et al., 2008, for 
details). In 2009, to improve statistical power for this study, an additional 500 households 
were drawn from these 37 villages as well as 8 nearby villages.  
                                                 
11 Since monsoon onset varies across years, the start of the first phase is defined as the day in June when 
accumulated rainfall since June 1 exceeds 50mm. If <50mm of rain falls in June, the first phase begins automatically 
on July 1. 11 
 
Each farming household received a visit to their home in June 2009, at the onset of 
the 2009 monsoon season, from a member of a trained team of enumerators from the 
agricultural research organization ICRISAT. During the visit, the enumerator first conducted 
a short survey, collecting demographic information and data on practices by the farmer 
during the previous monsoon. They then explained the recommended fertilizer dosages for 
castor and groundnut, the two main rain-fed cash crops in the area. The enumerator then 
explained the concept of insurance to the household, and gave specific details about the 
policies offered by ICICI Lombard. 
Each farmer was then given a scratch card (similar to the format of a scratch-off 
lottery ticket in the United States), revealing one of two treatments. The key treatment for the 
purposes of this paper is the assignment of the household to either an insurance group or a 
control group. The insurance treatment group received 10 Phase-I weather insurance policies, 
similar to those sold in the region in previous years (as described in Section 2.A). The 
“control” group was promised a fixed future cash payment of Rs. 350 (i.e. our estimate of the 
expected payouts of these 10 policies). This compensation was offered to ensure that 
differences in behavior between the insurance and control group would be due to the state-
contingent nature of the insurance, rather than any wealth effects arising from the expected 
value of the insurance. The fixed payment was also promised to be delivered at the same 
time as the insurance payouts, so that differences in behavior would not be driven by 
differences in the timing of payments. 
  A second independent treatment was also provided via the scratch card, involving 
coupons for discounts on locally appropriate inorganic fertilizer (DAP in Anantapur, NP 
fertilizer in Mahbubnagar). Unfortunately the implementation of this treatment was largely 
unsuccessful because of logistical issues in the field
12; for that reason, we do not study it 
here. 
                                                 
12 The number of coupons (or bags) with a subsidy was calibrated to fertilizer usage reported in a survey conducted 
in 2006. According to that survey, 70 percent of farmers in Mahbubnagar but only 34.4 percent in Anantapur had 
used fertilizer and those that did would purchase at most two bags. However, follow-up data collected in November 
2009 revealed much higher fertilizer usage (see Section 4.F for details). 12 
 
Treatments were applied randomly and independently across households. The use of 
scratch cards ensured that neither the respondent nor the enumerator was aware of the 
household’s treatment status while the survey was being conducted. Farmers also had the 
option to purchase additional insurance policies independently from the local vendor, 
BASIX, although few did so in practice. 
  In November 2009, after the growing season, the ICRISAT team revisited each study 
household, and conducted a follow-up survey. In addition to demographic data, the survey 
collected information on livestock, financial assets (including savings, loans, and insurance), 
agricultural investments and production decisions during the monsoon, as well as attitudes 
towards and expectations of weather and insurance payout, and risk-coping behavior.  
  Although no payouts had been made by the time the follow-up survey concluded, 
because of the poor monsoon in 2009, 93% of the farmers in the treated group expected to 
receive a payout. In addition, roughly the same percentage thought that crop yields would be 
below average.  
Figure 1 plots realized cumulative total rainfall (blue line) and cumulative “index” 
rainfall (measured from when the policy started), for each of the five policies. The gold 
horizontal lines represent the strike (top) and exit (bottom) levels of rainfall for each rainfall 
station in the study. For example, in Naryanpet, rainfall was very low in June, never reaching 
the trigger amount of 50 mm. Thus, the policy started automatically on July 1
st. Rainfall 
levels quickly cross the exit (5mm) level, but never exceeded 16 mm. Each policy therefore 
triggered a payout of Rs. 10 x (50-16), or Rs. 340. Since each treated farmer received ten 
policies, each farmer received a total payout of Rs. 3,400. Farmers in Anantapur received 
per-policy payouts of (30-10) x 10 = Rs. 200 (i.e. Rs. 2,000 in total). In Hindupur, no rainfall 
fell in the month of July, triggering the ‘exit’; consequently, farmers received a payout of Rs. 
1,000 per policy, or Rs. 10,000 in total. This amount is significant: it is equivalent to 90% of 
median savings for our sample, measured as of the start of the monsoon. 
[Insert figure 1 here] 13 
 
  Payouts to the insurance and control group were made in December 2010 and January 
2011. Notably, this timing was well after one might have expected, given that the policies 
indicate a settlement date of “thirty days after the data release by data provider and verified 
by Insurer.” However, the timing was relatively consistent with previous monsoon seasons. 
The long timeframe for payment of insurance payouts reflected both slow release of the data 
by the relevant collectors and slow processing by ICICI Lombard. 
 
3. Summary Statistics  
Table 1 presents summary statistics for baseline characteristics the sample, based on 
the baseline and follow up surveys conducted before and after the 2009 monsoon season. 
Logistical constraints precluded conducting an extremely detailed baseline survey, however 
detailed historical planting and demographic data are available for the households that were 
included in earlier studies. For the households added to the sample in 2009, we asked 
respondents in November 2009 to provide information about fixed characteristics (e.g., 
schooling) and provide recall data on the value of livestock and other assets as of June 2009.  
[Insert table 1 here] 
Panel A presents basic demographic data. The average household has 5.35 members 
with a 49.6-year old household head; most household heads (91%) are male. On average, 
household heads have obtained 3.75 years of schooling, with over half (54%) reporting being 
“unschooled.” Literacy is low, with respectively only 44 and 41 percent of heads reporting 
being able to read and write. These basic household characteristics are similar to the general 
sample of farmers studied in our previous work (e.g. see the summary statistics presented in 
Cole et al. 2013, which are based on a 2006 survey instrument). Given that assignment to the 
insurance treatment and control group was randomized, we would not expect to observe 
statistically significant systematic differences between the characteristics of households 
offered insurance (treatment) and those offered cash equivalent (control). This hypothesis is 
tested in Appendix Table A1, for demographic characteristics (Panel A), livestock and other 
assets including land (Panel B), financial assets and credit (Panel C), (Panel D), as well as 14 
 
agricultural investments during the 2008 monsoon. Validating the randomization, we find a 
statistically significant difference between the two groups only for one variable, the use of 
non-traditional savings variables.  
In Table 2, we report agricultural investment decisions for the year of our 
intervention, the summer of 2009. An overwhelming majority (93%) of farmers planted some 
crop in 2009, and roughly 48% of farmers planted cash crops. We note that the fraction of 
farmers planting cash crops is significantly higher in 2008 than in 2009. This reflects the 
poor realized quality of the 2009 monsoon. 
[Insert table 2 here] 
 
4. Estimation results 
A. Baseline estimates 
  Table 3 presents estimates of the local average treatment effect of the insurance 
treatment on farmers’ agricultural investments during the 2009 monsoon. As discussed in 
section 3, we measure investments in agricultural inputs (i.e. the market value of the input 
actually  used by the farmer) across a number of categories, including seeds, fertilizer, 
manure, pesticide, irrigation and hired labor. These are measured in the follow-up survey 
conducted after the end of the monsoon. They reflect total investments for all crops, 
including castor and groundnut but also lower-yielding crops such as sorghum. For five 
investment categories, we separately also measure the value of the input used only for the 
production of the cash crops castor and groundnut. We also record information about the area 
of land sown under castor, groundnut and in total, amongst other follow-up information. 
  Table 3 studies four outcome variables: (i) a dummy equal to one if any agricultural 
inputs were used during the monsoon, (ii) the area of land sown, (iii) the market value of 
agricultural inputs used, and (iv) the value of agricultural inputs purchased. For the first three 
outcome variables, we separately study inputs used for the production of castor and 
groundnut. (We did not collect this information for the “market value of inputs purchased” 
variable). These cash crop estimates are presented separately in the table. 15 
 
  [Insert table 3 here] 
  In Section A each outcome variable is regressed on a dummy for whether the 
household received the insurance treatment (the key variable of interest), a set of village 
dummies, and a dummy for an independent fertilizer treatment. A tobit estimator is used for 
the continuous variables, and a probit for the “any inputs used” dummy. To conserve space, 
only results for the coefficient of interest are presented. Specifications in section B are 
otherwise identical, except that they include measures of household socioeconomic status as 
additional controls. This is done as a robustness check. Adding the controls has little effect 
on our estimates, unsurprisingly, given that farmers were assigned randomly to the treatment 
and control groups (i.e. assignment should be uncorrelated with these household controls). 
  Studying investments in all crop types (the first column of results), we find a 
consistently positive although statistically insignificant effect of the insurance treatment on 
farmers’ input decisions. If the analysis is restricted to castor and groundnut investments, 
however, the treatment effects are quantitatively much larger, and consistently statistically 
significant (at the 5% level or better) in each specification. Quantitatively, the probability of 
planting cash crops increases by 6 percentage points (or 12 percent). Ln(1+land planted for 
cash crops) increases by 0.163, equivalent to a 27 percent increase in land sown for a farmer 
who would have planted 2 acres of cash crops in the absence of the treatment.
13 
  As a different way of viewing this relationship, figure 2 plots the cumulative density 
function of investment in cash crops by insurance treatment status. Underlying the average 
treatment effects presented in table 3, it appears that the effect of the insurance treatment is 
quite non-linear. A sizeable number of farmers are pushed from not growing cash crops into 
growing cash crops, as also shown in the regression results. But for those farmers in the top 
part of the distribution of cash crop investments, insurance provision has little or no effect on 
investment in castor and groundnut. In other words, the effect of insurance is primarily on 
the extensive rather than the intensive margin.  
                                                 
13 If the farmer originally planted to sow two acres of cash crops, our point estimate implies that the new quantity of 
land planted for cash crops will be exp((ln(1+2)+0.163)-1) = 2.53 acres, a 26.5% increase. Recall that about half the 
farmers in our sample plant no cash crops during the 2009 monsoon. A small minority planted no crops at all. This is 
due to the poor realized quality of the 2009 monsoon. 16 
 
[Insert figure 2 here] 
We also note from figure 2 that there is a discrete jump in cash crop investment once 
the farmer decides to invest a positive amount. This points to the presence of scale 
economies; it is inefficient for farmers to sow cash crops below a minimum scale. Around 
this threshold, access to insurance against income risk makes farmers more willing to invest 
a positive amount in castor and/or groundnut. 
B. Individual inputs  
Table 4 decomposes the average treatment effect estimates for cash crops by 
individual input type. These individual inputs are measured with less statistical power than 
their sum. The treatment effect for each input is positive in all ten cases, however it is 
generally not statistically significant, except in the case of pesticide. 
[Insert table 4 here]  
C. Interaction effects 
In Table 5, we test for heterogeneity in the treatment effect identified above, by 
measures of household wealth, education and expectations. We estimate regressions of the 
form: 
outcome = f(a + b. insurance + c. characteristic + d. insurance  x characteristic + … + e). 
where “insurance” is a dummy for insurance treatment status, and “characteristic” is the 
source of heterogeneity of interest (e.g. wealth, education etc.). The primary coefficient of 
interest is the coefficient d on the interaction term in this regression. As in table 4, we 
consider three outcome variables, a dummy for whether the farmer plants cash crops, the 
value of their investment in cash crops, and the area of land planted with cash crops. 
[Insert table 5 here] 
We first study how the insurance treatment effect varies with two wealth measures: 
acres of land owned, and a wealth index derived as the first principal component of asset 
holdings (as described in table 3). These are included as interaction characteristics one at a 
time. It is unclear what effect is expected. On one hand, wealthier households may have 17 
 
better ex post consumption insurance against adverse shocks (as in Mobarak and 
Rosenzweig, 2012), making them less likely to respond to rainfall insurance. On the other 
hand, wealthy farmers may be in a better position to adjust agricultural practices in response 
to a shift in the risk-return frontier introduced by insurance (e.g. because they are less 
financially constrained). Empirically we find mixed and weak results – the treatment effect is 
increasing in landholdings but decreasing in the wealth index; neither is statistically 
significant. We note that the uninteracted coefficient on both these terms is however highly 
positive and statistically significant, as expected (i.e., wealthy farmers are much more likely 
to invest in cash crops). 
Next, we consider heterogeneity by two measures of educational attainment: log years 
of education, and a dummy for whether the household head is literate. Strikingly, we find 
large, positive and highly statistically significant interaction effects between the insurance 
treatment and both of these education measures. In other words, the treatment effect of 
insurance provision on production behavior is concentrated amongst educated households. 
This heterogeneity by educational attainment is economically as well as statistically 
significant. Among literate farmers, assignment to the insurance treatment group increases 
the likelihood of investing in cash crops by 15 percentage points; among illiterate farmers, 
the treatment effect is indistinguishable from zero. 
In the last part of the table, we consider an index that specifically measures the 
farmer’s knowledge of the insurance product (measured ex ante). The interaction term for 
this variable is positive although not statistically significant. In other words, it is the farmer’s 
overall education level, not their specific measured knowledge of the insurance policy, that 
appears to matter for the strength of the treatment effect. We also find no evidence of 
significant heterogeneity in the strength of the treatment affect associated with the farmer’s 
measured expectations about the dispersion of yields.
14 
                                                 
14 In unreported regression specifications (available on request), we also test whether those more likely to have 
purchased insurance in the past behave differently. We focus on exogenous likelihood of having purchased 
insurance, using randomly assigned marketing treatments from prior years (described in Cole et al., 2013) to predict 
a probability of purchase.  It may be the case that those more experience with the insurance product trust the 
product, and are hence more likely to change behavior. We do not find any differential effect among those who were 
more likely to have purchased insurance. 18 
 
Summing up, we find strikingly significant evidence that the insurance treatment 
effects are concentrated amongst educated farmers, although little evidence of significant 
heterogeneity in other dimensions, at least given the power of our statistical tests. Our 
finding on education has interesting implications for the distributional effects of financial 
innovation. We note a caveat on our conclusions, however – while our insurance treatment is 
randomly assigned, these household characteristics of course are not. Thus, it is possible that 
our results could reflect omitted variables which are correlated with educational attainment, 
but not with wealth.   
D. Timing 
Figure 3 presents estimates of how the insurance treatment affects the timing of investments 
in cash crops. This figure is constructed by estimating a series of regressions similar to those 
from table 4 that trace out how the insurance treatment affects the probability of planting 
cash crops by different points in the monsoon season. Indicated on the figure is the start and 
end of the period in which the insurance treatment was given to households. 
  [Insert figure 3 here] 
The insurance treatment effect is extremely close to zero at the point the insurance 
policies are randomly allocated across farmers. The cumulative treatment effect by date then 
rises sharply, becoming statistically significant prior to the average end of the realized 
insurance coverage period (this end point varies by policy). It then flattens out, and 
ultimately converges to the point estimate from the average treatment effect regression 
presented in table 3.  
This figure illustrates the fact that the effect of the insurance on behavior appears to 
be ex ante in nature; it occurs well before the end of the insurance coverage period, and many 
months before the insurance payout itself is received. This is consistent with the 
interpretation that farmers view insurance as being a reason to take riskier ex ante production 
decisions, in the knowledge that they are partially hedged in the event of a poor monsoon 
outcome, consistent with the theoretical model presented in the Appendix, and the literature 
cited earlier.  19 
 
As a further test of this “ex ante” interpretation of our findings, we re-estimate the 
interaction specification from table 5 using ex post realized payouts as the interaction 
variable. This interaction variable is quantitatively small and statistically insignificant. This 
suggests farmers’ monsoon investment responses to the insurance treatment are not simply a 
response to an anticipation of receiving high payouts due to low expected rainfall. 
E. Qualitative self-reported changes in behavior 
To complement the quantitative evidence presented above, in the follow-up survey 
conducted after the monsoon, we also simply asked farmers from the insure sample whether 
and how the provision of insurance affected their investment behavior. For example, we ask 
farmers whether the knowledge that they held rainfall insurance led to an increase, decrease 
or no change in the amount of fertilizer, seeds and other inputs they used, and whether it 
influenced decisions about planting, replanting and/or abandoning crops. Results are 
presented in table 6. 
[Insert table 6 here] 
We find that a significant fraction of respondents report not changing their behavior, 
but that amongst those that did, most reported increasing investments in agricultural inputs, 
rather than reducing them. For example, 50% reported using more fertilizer, while only 14% 
reported using less fertilizer. More generally, a larger fraction of respondents indicated that 
they used more seeds, more pesticide, more hired labor, and borrowed more, in comparison 
with those who reported “used less”, though some of these differences are quite modest. The 
only input of which farmers said they were influenced to use less on average was bullock 
labor. Farmers also report that their awareness of being insured also influenced them towards 
planting earlier, and against abandoning crops. 
We view this evidence as being suggestive at best, given the qualitative nature of the 
questions posed to farmers. We did not ask farmers to estimate the size of their investment 
responses, for example. However, to the extent that weight should be placed on these 
responses, they appear consistent with our overall finding of a relationship between 
insurance and investment in risky agricultural activities. 20 
 
F. Other robustness checks 
We have conducted a number of additional unreported robustness checks on the 
results presented above, that are omitted from the tables because of space considerations. 
Concerned about the potential influence of outlier observations for the continuous variables 
we use, we re-estimated our main results after winsorizing the top and bottom 2% of all 
continuous variables. This has little effect on our results. Estimating linear probability 
models instead of using tobit and probit estimators also has fairly modest effects on the 
results, as does adding further household characteristics as controls.  
 
5: Willingness to pay for insurance 
The evidence presented above suggests that that increased ownership of the risk 
management instrument leads farmers to select a portfolio of crops with higher expected 
returns. In this section, we report on an experiment, conducted one year later, which 
measures farmer willingness to pay for rainfall insurance with varying contract terms, using 
the incentive-compatible BDM mechanism. Willingness to pay is elicited for four different 
policies, varying the contract terms to understand what features farmers value most. 
The goal of this follow-up experiment is to understand how consumers value these 
complex insurance products and to provide insight into their long-run commercial viability. 
A. Experimental design  
The experiment was conducted with a sample of 1,978 farmers comprising 1,464 
participants from the 2009 study described above, as well as 514 new subjects randomly 
selected from the same and nearby villages. An interviewer visited each household between 
May and August 2010 and offered individuals the chance to participate in a game in which 
they would have the opportunity to purchase rainfall insurance policies at a discounted price. 
If the respondent agreed, the interviewer explained the BDM mechanism and the 
experimental procedure as follows. 
The subject would have a chance to study the details of an insurance policy, and then 
record, in rupees, her willingness to pay for it. She would examine, and record a price, for 21 
 
four different policies. However, only one of these four policies would in fact be available 
for sale. The policy for sale would be revealed only after the subject had stated willingness to 
pay for all four policies. This would be done by scratching off the opaque surface on a 
scratch card. 
The scratch card would also indicate the offer price for the insurance policy selected. 
If the subject’s bid were greater than or equal to the offer price, the subject would purchase 
the policy, at the price on the scratch card. If the subject’s bid were less than the offer price, 
no insurance policy would be sold.  
Since this was a slightly complicated mechanism, great care was taken to explain the 
mechanism to participants. Individuals had the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the 
structure of the game by simulating the initial round of the game bidding for a chocolate bar. 
B. Insurance Policies 
The policies resembled typical rainfall insurance policies sold in the area. Each policy 
covered approximately one-eighth of the production costs of the main cash crop in the area in 
one acre of land, with a coverage period of 35 days. The period of the monsoon that was 
covered was split into two phases: Phase I polices provided coverage for the sowing period, 
while Phase II covering the podding period. Initially, farmers were offered Phase I policies. 
But 1,432 households were visited after the cut-off date to sell Phase I policies had passed; 
these households were offered Phase II policies instead.
15  
In each village, the nearest rainfall station was identified. As in our 2009 experiments, 
the experiment used policies relating to five rainfall stations: Atmakur, Mahbubnagar, 
Narayanpet in the Mahbubnagar district and Anantapur and Hindupur in the Anantapur 
district.  
Each household participating in the game bid for four different policies, which were 
chosen by us to test different theories of insurance demand. In particular, the complexity of 
the rainfall insurance product may raise concerns about individuals’ ability to evaluate it. The 
                                                 
15 The coverage period of Phase I policies was activated once the total cumulative rainfall in the month of June had 
exceeded 50 mm, which occurred on June 12. 22 
 
four policies individuals were asked to bid are described below.
16 Their exact contract 
features are given in table 7. In addition, we compute the expected value of actual and 
modified policies, based on historical rainfall data, for the two districts for which data are 
available (Anantapur and Mahbubnagar). 
  Real Policy - This was the actual policy, designed by the insurance company ICICI 
Lombard, and targeted at farmers in the area.  
  Modified Exit - The insurance contracts paid a large sum (Rs. 1,000) if an “exit” 
condition was reached, which was meant to correspond to total crop failure. In the 
real policies, this exit level was often 0, but sometimes 5, 6, or 10 mm. In the 
modified exit policies, the bar for the maximum payout was raised by 5 mm. For 
example, the Real Policy for Anantapur Phase II had an exit of 0 mm, while the 
Modified Exit had an exit of 5mm. This shift has a dramatic effect on value, 
increasing the expected payout of the policy by 40 and 65 Rupees in Anantapuram 
and Mahbubnagar, respectively. 
  Modified mm payment - Recall that policies are designed such that any rainfall 
below the strike level results in payouts. If the rainfall falls between the strike and the 
exit, the Real Policy pays Rs. 10 per mm of deficit. For example, for Anantapur Phase 
II, the strike is 30mm. The Real Policy would pay Rs. 100 if actual rainfall were Rs. 
20mm (10 Rs. for each mm deficit). The modified mm payment policy reduced the 
amount paid per mm to Rs. 5. Hence, an actual rainfall of 20 mm would result in a 
payout of only Rs. 50 in the modified mm payment. Because much of the expected 
value of the policy is driven by tail events, this has a much more modest effect on the 
expected value of the policy, reducing it by 22 and 11 rupees in Anantapur and 
Mahbubnagar, respectively.  
  Basis Risk - To understand how important basis risk is to clients, the “Basis Risk” 
policy was randomly assigned to be a real policy, but one based on a distant rainfall 
station. This manipulation changes the correlation of payouts with the farmers’ likely 
                                                 
16 In addition, farmers bid on a package of ten real policies. We omit results on that bidding from this paper.  23 
 
loss, but because the policies were calibrated by the insurance company to have 
roughly the same expected value, does not change the mean payout appreciably. 
[Insert table 7 here] 
Expected values were calculated using historical rainfall data. Unfortunately, data 
issues limit the set of policies for which we can currently calculate expected values. 
The use of scratch cards made clear to the participant that the policy and offer price 
were pre-determined, and that her answers would not affect which policy was actually sold, 
or the price at which it was offered. The policy offered to each household was always the 
actual ICICI Lombard policy sold in the area. The offer price was randomly drawn from a 
uniform distribution between 0 and the face value of the policy. 
To examine the possibility of anchoring effects, that is, that the order in which 
participants were offered policies might affect the bidding price, each individual was shown 
policies in one of two randomly selected order: Ordering 1 (Real Policy, Modified Exit, 
Modified mm payment, and Basis Risk), and Ordering 2 (Basis Risk, Modified mm payment, 
Modified Exit, and Real Policy). As discussed above, the three policies presented that were 
not the true policies differed in one and only one contract feature, but were otherwise 
identical along all other dimensions.  
While in principal participants might have “reneged” on their offer price, and failed to 
complete a transaction, in practice we did not record any instance of participants declining to 
purchase a policy at a price below their stated willingness to pay. Participants were not told 
that any particular policy was real or not real, nor were they told how the policy offered to 
them was selected by the research team. 
C. Results 
We first verify that there were no anchoring effects in reported bids. Table 8 reports 
average bid for each of the four policies we consider. The column marked “Ordering 1 
Mean” lists the average bids received for the policies in the standard ordering (Real, Exit, 
mm deviation, basis risk), while the next column lists the average bids for the reversed 
ordering. As is apparent from the similarity between the numbers listed in the two columns, 24 
 
the order in which the policies were presented did not significantly affect farmers’ 
willingness to pay. The remaining columns of Table 8 provide the mean, standard deviation, 
and percentile distribution of bids for various policies. 
[Insert table 8 here] 
The average bid for the “real” policy is Rs. 68.4, which is less than the face value 
charged for the policy (Rs. 100-110, depending on the policy), but greater than our estimate 
of the expected payout (Rs. 44-54). Indeed, the median bid is 70, well above the actuarial 
price of the policy.
17 This suggests that, if distribution costs were reduced dramatically—for 
example, by allowing purchase, and claims payouts—with mobile money, or by lowering the 
loading factors especially for policies linked to rainfall stations with a long series of 
historical data, the policies could be quite successful commercially.
18  
Table 9 reports the main results of this experiment: regressions of farmer willingness 
to pay on contract type. Results for Phase I bids are in column (1), Phase II bids in column 
(2), and all bids pooled in Column (3). The results are consistent across specification. 
Relative to the real policy, farmers’ valuation falls by 12-13 rupees when the policy offers a 
smaller payout of only Rs. 5 per mm shortfall. In contrast, increasing the rainfall threshold 
for the “exit” (large payment) to occur, increases willingness to pay by approximately the 
same amount, Rs. 11.  
[Insert table 9 here] 
This finding is striking and has implications for the pricing of such polices. On 
average, the farmers clearly understand that the tweaks (lower mm deviation payment; higher 
threshold for exit) affect the value of the policy, and adjust their valuations in the directions 
predicted by a rational expectations benchmark. However, they do not get the magnitudes 
right, even from an expected value perspective: the former reduces the expected value of 
policies by Rs. 10-20, while the latter increases the expected value by Rs. 40-70. 
                                                 
17 In fact, these bids may be an underestimate of actual willingness to pay, as farmers never bid more than the face 
value of the policy. 
18 In the U.S., the ratio of claims to premiums is 76.2 percent for automobile insurance, and 64.7 percent for 
homeowner’s insurance. Rainfall insurance policies sold for Rs. 70 (the median bid), with an average payout of Rs. 
50 would fall within that range, and in fact involve much less administrative cost, since there would be neither risk 
assessment nor claims verification. 25 
 
The fact that farmers are likely to be risk averse makes these differential responses 
even more puzzling. The “exit” policy increases the probability the policy will pay out large 
amounts, in times of severe drought (yields are likely to be very low whether rainfall is 0 or 5 
mm). In contrast the “mm” policy affects the size of payment when droughts are less severe. 
Put differently, farmers seem less sensitive to changes to the policy terms that affect payouts 
in low-probability events and relatively more sensitive to changes in the policy terms that 
affect more often payouts. As a result, there may be a disconnect between what farmers want, 
i.e. policies with higher frequency payouts and what farmers may need given risk aversion, 
i.e. policies that pay relatively more in low-probability events.  
Finally, the coefficient on the indicator for the policy that induces substantial basis 
risk is negative and very large, roughly halving farmers’ willingness to pay for policies. 
Choosing a distant rainfall station did not affect the average payout of the policy. This 
suggests that farmers are quite sensitive to basis risk, and that efforts to improve index 
policies to reduce basis risk, such as using satellite imagery or a denser network of weather 
stations may substantially improve the value of products to customers. 
Column (4) adds controls for new participants, who express a higher average 
willingness to pay than individuals part of the original sample, for policy ordering, which is 
not significant, and for income distribution quartiles. Richer households express a higher 
willingness to pay, though the spread is not particularly large (6 Rs. per policy). 
In Table 10, we ask whether all farmers react in the same way to changes in contract 
features, or whether there is heterogeneity in response. Specifically, we split the sample into 
quartiles based on income (column 1), education (column 2), and self-assessed financial 
sophistication. Each regression includes the same policy dummies as before, as well as 
quartile dummies for income, education, or sophistication, and finally interaction terms 
between this quartile value (equal to 1, 2, 3, or 4) and a dummy for the alternative policies.  
[Insert table 10 here] 
The results in column 1 suggest that wealthier individuals are willing to pay more for 
insurance. Examining heterogeneous effects, the only interaction that is significant is with 26 
 
exit, though the magnitude is not meaningful: the poorest quartile would pay Rs. 11.3 more 
for a policy with a higher exit threshold, while the richest quartile would pay only 10.3 for 
the policy. Similarly, we do not observe systematic variation by education quartile.
19 
The most interesting pattern emerges in column (3). Here, we find that financially 
sophisticated households are more sensitive to changes in contract terms, and that these 
changes go in the “right” direction. Moving from the least to most sophisticated quartile, for 
example, roughly doubles the reduction in willingness to pay for the mm Dev policy, and 
increases by 50% the willingness to pay for the modified exit policy.  
D. Discussion 
Taken together, these results have several important implications for the development 
of the weather insurance market. They imply that rainfall insurance in India, marketed with 
loading (expected payout) at the same level as standard policies in the United States, would 
face robust demand: over half of farmers whose willingness to pay we elicit would purchase 
in at this price. Moreover, there may be considerable scope for improving the policy, as 
experimentally induced basis risk resulted in dramatically lower valuation. 
However, the results also suggest that relying exclusively on an unregulated private 
sector may not lead to contracts that maximize consumer welfare. Limited financial 
sophistication may present an important barrier. Consumer willingness to pay varies with 
features of the product, but customers appear to misprice certain contract terms relative to 
others. An insurance company seeking to maximize short-term profit may design a policy 
with features consumers find valuable, but which offers relatively little value to the 
consumer. While one might hope that agents could help customers select the best policy, the 
record of insurance agents in India in this regard is not encouraging (Anagol, Cole and 
Sarkar, 2013). 
Finally, from a methodological perspective, the experiment demonstrates the utility of 
the BDM in the field, and shows how a simple experimental set-up, involving the cost of a 
                                                 
19 Roughly 51% of household heads report the lowest level of schooling: these individuals are assigned to the first 
quartile; the remaining half is assigned to either the third or fourth quartile.  27 
 
single household visit, can immediately yield credible data that can be used to answer a 
number of questions.
20 
 
6. Further discussion and conclusions 
We find evidence that the provision of insurance against an important source of 
production risk influences production decisions by our sample of small agricultural firms. 
This change in behavior occurs primarily through a substitution in agricultural investments 
towards higher-risk, higher-return cash crops, and is concentrated amongst educated farmers. 
Our results, alongside complementary independent recent work by Mobarak and Rosensweig 
(2012), Karlan et al. (2012) and Cai et al. (2012), suggests that insurance arrangements that 
“fill in” missing markets have significant effects on production and risk-taking. 
The lack a discernible effect of insurance coverage on total agricultural expenditures 
and land use could be consistent with the presence of fixed short-run production factors (e.g. 
a given amount of land, which cannot be easily adjusted in the short run), or the presence of 
financial constraints. It could also reflect limited statistical power of our tests.       
We emphasize the point that our results measure the ex ante effects of insurance on 
behavior. Insurance may have further effects on behavior after payouts are received by 
farmers. While the period over which we measure behavior ends significantly before payouts 
were received, it is possible that our findings in part reflect anticipation of future payouts by 
farmers. We note however that the strength of the treatment effects we estimate is 
uncorrelated with actual realized payouts, suggesting that this anticipation channel is not the 
primary mechanism driving our results. 
We emphasize that our evidence does not provide a direct estimate of the welfare 
benefits of access to insurance. Indeed, previous research discusses the fact that take-up of 
rainfall index insurance has been modest to date. Cole et al. (2013) discuss the determinants 
of insurance demand in detail, highlighting that high prices relative to expected payoffs are 
one reason for low demand. The BDM experiments described in this paper confirm that 
                                                 
20 We are aware of two other implementations of the BDM mechanism in the field: Cole, Stein and Tobacman 
(2011), and Berry et al. (2012). 28 
 
insurance demand is significantly price sensitive. Rainfall index insurance coverage is 
increasing over time; Cole, Stein, and Tobacman (2010) find increasing levels of take-up in 
Gujarat, and in regions of India, commercial sales have been quite high. Still, we are aware 
of no data set in which farmers have close to as much coverage as those in this study. 
Through the lens of corporate finance, our findings are consistent with theoretical 
models predicting an interaction between risk management and production or investment 
decisions (e.g. Froot and Stein, 1998). From a development economics perspective, they 
suggest that incomplete insurance may be an important constraint on development. 
Consequently, financial innovations that improve risk diversification, such as the insurance 
policy studied here, may play a significant role in boosting growth and real incomes in 
emerging market economies.  
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Appendix A: Model of insurance and production decisions 
This Appendix presents a simple illustrative model of an agricultural entrepreneur to 
highlight the interaction between production decisions and insurance provision. The key 
result is that for a risk-averse farmer, investment in risky production activities is increasing 
in their access to insurance against production risk. Note that, while we assume a very simple 
setting to build intuition, the basic results we derive extend to a much more general class of 
models. 
A. Basic setup and timing 
Consider a one-period model of a farmer with initial wealth W0 and constant absolute risk 
aversion (CARA) utility. The farmer has access to a risky production activity or project (e.g. 
sowing cash crops, or applying fertilizer), and decides at the start of the period what fraction 
of their wealth to devote to this risky activity. The remainder of their wealth is invested in a 
safe activity, which we assume for simplicity produces a real return of zero.  
We denote the amount invested in the risky production activity by  . The net return 
on investment (per rupee invested) is given by  + e, where   is the expected return and e 
is a zero-mean normally distributed error term: e  N(0, 
2
e). 
The farmer can partially hedge the production risk associated with the risky activity 
by purchasing insurance. We denote the amount spent on insurance premia by . The 
insurance payout is negatively correlated with the return on investment, but not perfectly (i.e. 
there is some basis risk). Net of the initial premium, the net payout on the insurance (per 
rupee of premium) is given by: -e + u - , where u  N(0, 
2
u). The higher is 
2
u, the greater 
the basis risk. We generally assume that  > 0, which means that the expected insurance 
payout net of the premium is negative (i.e. the insurance is not actuarially fair).
21 
To summarize the timing: at the start of the period the farmer chooses how much to 
invest ( ) and how much insurance to purchase (). At the end of the period, the return on 
the risky production activity and the insurance payout are realized. The farmer then 
                                                 
21 This could be because of imperfect competition amongst insurers, administrative costs of providing the insurance, 
or a compensation for the risk borne by the insurer. 
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consumes their initial wealth W0 plus their net income from the investment and from 
insurance. 
We assume the farmer faces an interior solution in equilibrium (i.e. the fraction of 
their wealth invested in the risky project, inclusive of any insurance purchased, is between 
zero and one). Finally we assume that  is large enough so that insurance demand is positive 
in equilibrium. 
B. Optimal investment in the presence of insurance 
The farmer’s objective is to maximize expected end-of period utility E[u(W1)]. End of period 
wealth (W1) is given by the law of motion: 
 
 
Given our exponential-normal setup, and denoting the farmer’s coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion by , the farmer’s problem can be written as: 
  
max ,  E[u(W1)] = max ,  {E(W1) -  ½ var(W1)}     [A.1] 
where:  
E(W1) = W0 +   -  
var(W1) = ( - )
2
2
e + 
2
2
u 
 
Taking first order conditions of [A.1] with respect to  and , and solving the resulting 
simultaneous equations, the optimal investment level is given by the following expression: 
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An alternative and similar expression can be derived if we assume that the level of insurance 
 is assigned exogenously to the household, rather than being a decision variable. (This is the 
setting that corresponds most exactly to the design of our field experiment). In this case, 
optimal investment is given by the simpler expression: 
 
 ∗  
1
 
   
  
      
 
C. Comparative statics 
Inspecting expression [A.2] yields the following comparative statics results for the farmer’s 
equilibrium level of investment in the risky production activity: 
Proposition 1: The farmer’s equilibrium investment in the risky activity (
*) is: 
A.  decreasing in the expected per-unit net cost of insurance (). 
B.  decreasing in the basis risk of the insurance (
2
u) 
C.  decreasing in the variance of investment returns (
2
e) 
D. decreasing in risk aversion () 
E.  increasing in the expected return on investment ( ) 
Proof: By taking first derivatives of [A.2] with respect to each parameter. 
 
The same comparative statics results apply to the alternative expression for optimal 
investment assuming that insurance is assigned exogenously. The only difference is that part 
A of the Proposition instead states that investment in the risky production activity (
*) is 
increasing in the exogenously determined level of insurance, , rather than  being decreasing 
in the cost of insurance. 
R35 
 
The key result of this Proposition is that an improvement in access to insurance – 
either an increase in the amount of exogenously provided insurance, a reduction in the cost of 
the insurance, or an improvement in the quality of the insurance while keeping the cost fixed 
– increases investment in the risky activity.  
The simple intuition for these results is that the farmer’s optimal level of investment 
trades off the high expected return of the investment against its risk. Improving access to 
insurance against production risk allows the farmer to reduce the background risk associated 
with any given investment level (i.e. to shift this risk-return frontier outwards), allowing the 
farmer to invest more in equilibrium. Given these results, it is also straightforward to verify 
that the farmer’s expected income and expected utility are decreasing in the expected per-
unit net cost of insurance (), and the basis risk of the insurance (
2
u), so that improving 
access to insurance increases expected income and welfare. 
Note that since we assume exponential utility, there are no wealth effects in the model 
presented here. In reality, provision of insurance may affect behavior both through its risk-
management benefits and because it increases household wealth. To control for this, in our 
field work we compare two groups, one of which receives insurance for free, the other of 
which is promised the actuarial value of the insurance for free. In other words we effectively 
hold fixed the wealth of the household between the treatment and control groups. 
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Figure 1: Cumulative Rainfall during Kharif 2009, for Phase 1 Policies 
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Figure 2: Cumulative density, log investment in cash crops 
Y axis plots the natural log of 1 + the amount invested in cash crops (in Rs.) for the treatment 
and control groups, both sorted in increasing order of cash crop investment.  
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Figure 3: Effect of insurance treatment status on timing of cash crop investments 
The x-axis of the figure plots the passage of time in 2009. The y-axis plots the effect of 
insurance treatment status on the probability of having planted cash crops by the date in 
question. The three red vertical lines correspond to the start and end of the period in which 
insurance was distributed to farmers. 
 
 
 Variable N Mean SD p10 p50 p90
A. Demographic Characteristics
Household size 1,479      5.35 2.28 3 5 8
Number of children 6 years old or younger 1,479      0.20 0.54 0 0 1
Number of children 18 years old or younger 1,479      1.70 1.51 0 2 4
Age of household head (Years) 1,479      49.60 12.40 35 50 65
Highest level of schooling completed by HH (Years) 1,479      3.75 4.76 0 0 11
Household head is unschooled (1 = "Yes") 1,479      0.54 0.50
Household head able to read (1 = "Yes") 1,479      0.44 0.50
Household head able to write (1 = "Yes") 1,479      0.41 0.50
B. Livestock (as of June 2009)
N. of large animals owned, i.e. buffalos, cows and oxen 1,479      2.25 3.01 0 2 6
N. of small animals owned, i.e. goats, sheep, chicken, pigs 1,479      5.23 22.22 0 0 10
Total market value of livestock owned (Rs.) 1,479      34,263 58,623 0 20,000 80,000
C. Savings and Credit
Total amount of savings, all sources (Rs.) 1,479      21,353 29,472 0 11,000 56,980
   Amount of savings with bank or post office  (Rs.) 1,479      1,575 5,640 0 0 4,000
   Amount of savings in cash at home  (Rs.) 1,479      1,715 3,228 0 600 5,000
   Amount of savings in jewelry  (Rs.) 1,479      13,335 20,589 0 5,000 32,000
   Amount of savings with SHG or other group  (Rs.) 1,479      2,152 4,910 0 720 5,000
   Amount of other savings  (Rs.) 1,479      2,576 11,427 0 0 3,600
Total amount of credit owed, all sources (Rs.) 1,479      41,644 50,498 8,000 29,000 87,000
   Amount of credit from bank  (Rs.) 1,479      20,414 31,823 0 15,000 45,000
   Amount of credit from family and friends  (Rs.) 1,479      6,406 19,505 0 0 20,000
   Amount of credit from MFIs  (Rs.) 1,479      692 3,684 0 0 0
   Amount of credit from moneylenders  (Rs.) 1,479      12,747 30,840 0 0 35,000
   Amount of credit from other sources of credit  (Rs.) 1,479      1,386 5,079 0 0 5,000
D. Other Assets
House type: strong structure (1 = "Yes") 1,479      0.54 0.50
House type: semi-strong structure (1 = "Yes") 1,479      0.33 0.47
House type: weak structure (1 = "Yes") 1,479      0.13 0.33
Number or rooms in the house 1,479      2.63 1.34 1 2 4
Estimated value of the house if owned  (Rs.) 1,479      117,221 165,962 25,000 70,000 220,000
Total area of agricultural land (Acres) 1,479      5.37 5.47 2 4 10
Estimated value of agricultural land  (Rs.) 1,479      508,519 1,463,349 70,000 240,000 980,000
Est. value of non-agricultural land and other assets  (Rs.) 1,479      8,642 49,500 0 0 20,000
Notes: This table reports the summary statistics for the sample, which includes the 1479 individuals that
participated in both the baseline and follow-up surveys. The variables reported in Section C were collected
during the baseline survey conducted between April and June 2009. Variables in Section A, B and D were
collected during the follow up survey in November 2009, but respondents were asked to report answers as of
June 2009. 
Table 1: Household Summary StatisticsAmount 
>0 Mean SD p10 p50 p90
Amount 
>0 Mean SD p10 p50 p90
Land use:
Total cultivated land 0.93       4.00 3.59 1.00 3.00 8.00 0.48 1.92 2.98 0.00 0.00 5.00
In which Kartis did farmer plant?  15.68 2.78 13.00 16.00 18.00 15.26 2.29 13.00 15.00 18.00
Did farmer replant crop this Kharif? (1="Yes" ) 0.05
Did farmer abandon crop this Kharif? (1="Yes") 0.18
Total amount spent on inputs
Hybrid seeds 0.63 1,774 3,679 0 750 4,000
Improved seeds 0.59 3,871 6,112 0 1,500 11,000
Fertilizer 0.95 3,156 3,382 800 2,000 7,000
Manure 0.74 3,237 4,261 0 2,000 8,000
Pesticide 0.64 1,438 2,656 0 600 4,000
Irrigation 0.26 1,039 2,822 0 0 3,550
Hiring tractors or other implements 0.91 3,541 3,482 600 3,000 7,000
Manual labor 0.95 3,069 3,432 500 2,000 6,000
Bullock labor 0.68 1,299 1,933 0 1,000 3,000
Total amount spent, all inputs  0.98 22,424 19,935 6,300 16,600 44,500
Market value used for all crops:
Hybrid seeds 0.63 1,852 3,961 0 800 4,450 0.17 476 2,480 0 0 1,200
Improved seeds 0.56 3,779 6,012 0 1,200 11,000 0.31 2,402 5,537 0 0 8,000
Fertilizer 0.93 3,208 3,873 500 2,000 7,000 0.45 1,098 1,973 0 0 3,000
Manure 0.73 3,182 4,213 0 2,000 8,000 0.35 1,360 3,112 0 0 4,500
Pesticide 0.64 1,447 2,659 0 600 4,000 0.30 544 1,823 0 0 1,500
Irrigation 0.25 1,025 2,779 0 0 3,550
Hiring tractors or other implements 0.91 3,545 3,552 500 3,000 7,000
Manual labor 0.94 3,044 3,453 500 2,000 6,000
Bullock labor 0.68 1,295 1,943 0 1,000 3,000
Total market value used, inputs 1-5 0.96 13,467 13,758 2,600 9,500 28,700 0.49 6,123 11,096 0 0 17,800
Total market value used, all inputs 0.97 22,377 20,206 5,550 16,700 45,000
All Crops Cash Crops
Notes: Data were collected during the follow up survey conducted in November 2009. The sample includes the 1479 individuals that participated in both the baseline and follow-
up surveys. All reported monetary values are in Rupees. In November 2009, when this survey was conducted, the average exchange rate between US Dollars and Indian Rupees
was of Rs. 47 per dollar. The statistics report the mean of an indicator variable for whether the quantity listed is greater than zero, and the mean, standard deviation and
percentiles of the values. 
Table 2: Investment in Kharif 2009Crop types:
Insurance dummy pseudo-R
2 Insurance dummy pseudo-R
2 Estimator
(marginal effect) (marginal effect)
Any ag. inputs used (=1 if yes) 0.016  0.074  0.060**  0.213  probit
(0.012) (0.029)
ln(1+land under cultivation, acres) 0.029  0.05  0.163**  0.155  tobit
(0.034) (0.070)
ln(1+ag. inputs used, Rs.) 0.082  0.032  0.800**  0.092  tobit
(0.087) (0.387)
ln(1+ag. inputs purchased, Rs.) 0.05  0.032  tobit
(0.079)
Any ag. inputs used (=1 if yes)            0.013     0.133                0.065**   0.222     probit
         (0.010)             (0.030)   
ln(1+land under cultivation, acres)            0.041     0.133                0.176***  0.170     tobit
         (0.031)             (0.067)   
ln(1+ag. inputs used, Rs.)            0.112     0.062                0.862**   0.096     tobit
         (0.083)             (0.383)   
ln(1+ag. inputs purchased, Rs.)            0.079      0.065    
         (0.074)   
N 1479 1479
Village dummies yes yes
Note: Data were collected during the baseline and follow up surveys conducted in 2009. The sample includes the
1479 individuals that participated in both the baseline and follow-up surveys. Symbols *, **, *** denote
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. The dependent variables are: a dummy variable equal
to one if the household used any agricultural inputs, the log of (1+ the amount of land under cultivation), the log
of (1+ the value of inputs used), and the log (1+ the market value of inputs purchased). The column to the left
reports regression results for all crop types, while the column to the right reports regression results for cash crops
only. Cash crops are defined as castor in Mahbubnagar and groundnut in Anantapur. The top panel reports results
for the main specification, while the panel at the bottom includes household covariates as a robustness check.
Household covariates included in this specification are the age of the household head, the log of the number of
years of schooling of household head and the wealth index. The regressions include indicator variables for each
village.
Table 3. Effects of insurance on agricultural investments
All crop types Cash crops only
B. With household covariates
A. Without household covariatesDependent variable:
Insurance dummy pseudo-R
2 Insurance dummy pseudo-R
2
(marginal effect) (marginal effect)
Agricultural input used 
(Rs.):
Hybrid seeds            0.024    0.202            0.712    0.144
         (0.024)             (0.706)   
Improved seeds            0.025    0.316            0.383    0.17
         (0.029)             (0.474)   
Fertilizer            0.045    0.214            0.569    0.086
         (0.029)             (0.360)   
Manure            0.020    0.203            0.362    0.093
         (0.027)             (0.469)   
Pesticide            0.054**  0.254            0.932**  0.134
         (0.026)             (0.447)   
N 1479 1479
Village dummies yes yes
Estimator Probit Tobit
Note: Data was collected during the baseline and follow up surveys conducted in 2009. The sample
includes the 1479 individuals that participated in both the baseline and follow-up surveys. Symbols *,
**, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. Dependent variables are
listed in the first column to the left. Cash crops are defined as castor in Mahbubnagar and groundnut
in Anantapur. The regressions include village fixed effects.
Dummy: Investment > 0 ln(1+investment, Rs.)
Table 4. Cash crop treatment effects disaggregated by investment typeDependent variable:
Treatment 
(1=yes)
Hosehold 
covariate:
Treatment 
x covariate
Treatment 
(1=yes)
Hosehold 
covariate:
Treatment 
x covariate
Treatment 
(1=yes)
Hosehold 
covariate:
Treatment 
x covariate
Interaction variable is:
Wealth measures
Wealth index: principal component      0.062**      0.041***       -0.012           0.180***     0.171***       -0.035            0.871**      0.641***       -0.220   
         (0.029)        (0.013)        (0.018)           (0.068)        (0.030)        (0.042)           (0.388)        (0.168)        (0.235)   
ln(1+landholdings)        0.026        0.165***        0.018              0.118        0.755***        0.013              0.636        2.615***        0.052   
         (0.096)        (0.038)        (0.055)           (0.212)        (0.084)        (0.119)           (1.241)        (0.475)        (0.666)   
Education measures
Household head can read (1 = yes)       -0.001          -0.019         0.147**           -0.042          -0.077        0.469***          -0.048    -0.155      1.959** 
         (0.039)        (0.043)        (0.059)           (0.093)        (0.102)        (0.141)           (0.523)        (0.575)        (0.779)   
ln(1+years of education)       -0.007          -0.013        0.073***          -0.053    -0.04     0.218***          -0.128          -0.140        0.948***
         (0.039)        (0.019)        (0.027)           (0.094)        (0.046)        (0.063)           (0.529)        (0.259)        (0.348)   
Other measures
SD of exp. yield (kg/acre) of cash crops        0.090*          0.001          -0.001    0.173       -0.000          -0.000            1.269**         0.007          -0.010   
         (0.047)        (0.001)        (0.001)           (0.110)        (0.002)        (0.002)           (0.591)        (0.008)        (0.009)   
Insurance Knowledge Index       0.067*       -0.065**         0.022             0.150*       -0.129**         0.034              0.792        -0.921**         0.244   
         (0.039)        (0.026)        (0.034)           (0.088)        (0.065)        (0.089)           (0.482)        (0.380)        (0.504)   
Has heard of rainfall insurance (1=Yes)            0.292***       -0.104               0.537*         -0.105               4.182**        -1.003   
         (0.110)        (0.143)             (0.292)        (0.377)             (1.702)        (2.137)   
Estimator
Note: Data was collected during the baseline and follow up surveys conducted in 2009. The sample includes the 1479 individuals that
participated in both the baseline and follow-up surveys. The sample is equal to 1405 for probit regression, and 1479 for the tobit regressions.
Symbols *, **,***denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. The table reports marginal effects for the treatment dummy,
for the coefficient for the main interaction term, and for the interaction between the treatment dummy and the main effect. Each specification
includes a different main effect and interaction term, reported in the first column to the left. The specification that includes the insurance
knowledge index additionally includes a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent has never heard of rainfall insurance, and its interaction
term. Cash crops are defined as castor in Mahbubnagar and groundnut in Anantapur. The regressions include an indicator variable for each
village.
Table 5. Interaction effects
Dummy: Investment in cash crops > 0 ln(1+investment in cash crops, Rs.) ln(1+land cultivated for cash crops)
Probit Tobit TobitVariable N More No Change Less
Effect of rainfall insurance on:
The amount of:
Fertilizer 743 50% 36% 14%
Seeds 743 41% 43% 16%
Pesticides 743 32% 41% 27%
Bullock labor 743 23% 48% 29%
Hired labor 743 35% 42% 23%
Funds borrowed to finance agri inputs 743 26% 52% 22%
The timing of initial planting
Earlier 743 26%
No change 743 69%
Later 743 5%
The decision of whether to abandon crops
Against 743 26%
No change 743 67%
Towards 743 7%
Table 6:  Self-Reported Effects of Rainfall Insurance on Agricultural Investments
Notes: This table reports self-reported investment decisions among farmers in the treatment group with
data from a follow-up survey conducted in November 2009.Phase I
Station
Strike 
(mm)
Exit 
(mm)
Per mm 
(Rs)
Premium 
(Rs)
Exp. 
Payout
Strike 
(mm)
Exit 
(mm)
Per mm 
(Rs)
Premium 
(Rs)
Exp. 
Payout
Strike 
(mm)
Exit 
(mm)
Per mm 
(Rs)
Premium 
(Rs)
Exp. 
Payout
Atmakur 48 0 10 110 - 48 5 10 110 - 48 0 5 110 -
Anantpuram 25 6 10 110 - 25 10 10 110 - 25 6 5 110 -
Hindupur 25 5 10 80 - 25 10 10 80 - 25 5 5 80 -
Mehboobnagar 70 0 10 80 - 70 5 10 80 - 70 0 5 80 -
Narayanpet 38 0 10 100 - 38 5 10 100 - 38 0 5 100 -
Phase II
Station
Strike 
(mm)
Exit 
(mm)
Per mm 
(Rs)
Premium 
(Rs)
Exp. 
Payout
Strike 
(mm)
Exit 
(mm)
Per mm 
(Rs)
Premium 
(Rs)
Exp. 
Payout
Strike 
(mm)
Exit 
(mm)
Per mm 
(Rs)
Premium 
(Rs)
Exp. 
Payout
Atmakur 40 5 10 100 - 40 10 10 100 - 40 5 5 100 -
Anantpuram 30 0 10 110 44.4 30 5 10 110 110.1 30 0 5 110 22.2
Hindupur 15 0 10 120 - 15 5 10 120 - 15 0 5 120 -
Mehboobnagar 50 10 10 80 53.7 50 15 10 80 93.8 50 10 5 80 42.5
Narayanpet 53 5 10 100 - 53 10 10 100 - 53 5 5 100 -
Narayanpet
Atmakur
Reference Station
Mehboobnagar
Hindupur
Anantpuram
Policy from Distant Station
Table 7: BDM Experiment Policy Details
Policy from Distant Station
Reference Station
Policy Pays Less per mm Shortfall
Policy Pays Less per mm Shortfall Policy More Likely to Pay Maximum
Policy More Likely to Pay Maximum
Actual Policy
Actual Policy
Atmakur
Mehboobnagar
Hindpur
Anantpuram
NarayanpetAverage bid, by orderig:
Ordering 1 Ordering 2
Bid Type Mean Mean
Actual policy 69.0 67.9
Policy more likely to pay maximum amount (exit) 79.8 78.8
Policy pays less per mm shortfall (mm) 56.7 56.4
Policy from distant rainfall station (basis risk) 38.9 39.1
Average bid, summary statistics:
Bid Type Mean St Dev. p1 p5 p50 p95 p99 N
Actual policy 68.4 20.9 8 30 70 100 100 1978
Policy more likely to pay maximum amount (exit) 79.3 22.1 10 40 80 110 110 1978
Policy pays less per mm shortfall (mm) 56.5 18.2 6 30 55 90 100 1978
Policy from distant rainfall station (basis risk) 39.0 18.1 5 20 35 78 86 1978
All Bids
Notes: These tables report the average bid per policy. Each policy was assigned to a random ordering, and the Ordering 1 and Ordering 2 columns report the
average bids with respect to each. All monetary values are in Indian rupees. 
Table 8: Summary Statistics, Bid per PolicyPhase I Phase II All All
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Bid Bid Bid Bid
Policy pays less per mm of deviation (mm) -13.23*** -11.48*** -11.90*** -11.90***
(0.555) (0.356) (0.302) (0.302)
More likely policy pays maximum amount (exit) 11.33*** 10.71*** 10.86*** 10.86***
(0.196) (0.173) (0.140) (0.140)
Policy is from a distant rainfall station (basis risk) -30.69*** -29.06*** -29.45*** -29.45***
(0.712) (0.487) (0.408) (0.408)
Phase 2 Policy -5.001*** -5.050***
(0.881) (0.862)
New Participants 6.328***
(1.032)
Policy Ordering 2 -0.484
(0.792)
Income distribution (>25% & <55%) 2.021*
(1.152)
Income distribution (>50% & <75%) 2.842**
(1.263)
Income distribution (>75%) 6.392***
(1.249)
Constant 72.76*** 67.07*** 72.23*** 68.01***
(0.810) (0.558) (0.767) (1.252)
Observations 1,900 6,012 7,912 7,912
R-squared 0.433 0.344 0.368 0.380
Table 9: Regression Results of Bids on Policy Characteristics
Notes: The table reports OLS regression results clustered at the individual level. Column (1) and (2)
report regression results disaggregated by phase, while table (3) and (4) report regression results run on
the overall sample. Symbols *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES bid_po bid_po bid_po
Interaction term: Income Schooling Sophistication
Policy pays less per mm of deviation (mm) -12.30*** -11.99*** -7.375***
(0.794) (0.683) (0.631)
More likely policy pays maximum amount (exit) 11.71*** 10.66*** 7.868***
(0.365) (0.341) (0.331)
Policy is from a distant rainfall station (basis risk) -30.65*** -28.86*** -18.70***
(1.061) (0.926) (0.824)
Phase 2 policy -5.050*** -4.862*** -4.584***
(0.862) (0.882) (0.864)
New Participants 6.328*** 4.025*** 3.961***
(1.032) (0.911) (0.868)
Ordering -0.484 -0.443 -0.332
(0.792) (0.797) (0.779)
Quartile II 1.947* - 1.236
(1.178) - (1.426)
Quartile III 2.692** 0.0569 -4.063***
(1.343) (0.996) (1.399)
Quartile IV 6.167*** 2.053* -4.043***
(1.415) (1.137) (1.369)
[Variable] * mm  0.157 0.0502 -1.688***
(0.265) (0.356) (0.248)
[Variable] * exit -0.335** 0.114 1.116***
(0.136) (0.186) (0.107)
[Variable] * basis risk 0.477 -0.341 -4.007***
(0.363) (0.483) (0.326)
Constant 68.13*** 70.80*** 72.88***
(1.307) (1.022) (1.370)
Observations 7,912 7,912 7,912
R-squared 0.381 0.374 0.402
Table 10: Heterogenous Treatment Effects
The table reports OLS regression results run on the entire sample, clustered at the individual level. Column
(1) reports heterogeneous effects with respect to income, Column (2) reports heterogeneous effects with
respect to the years of schooling, and Column (3) reports results with respect to financial sophistication, an
index variable that aggregates self-reported levels of financial sophistication and insurance experience.
Symbols *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.Appendix Tabel A1: Sample Balancing - Panel A
Variable N
Treatment 
Mean
Control 
Mean Difference
Robust p-
value
Significance 
Level
A. Demographic Characteristics 
Household size 1,479         5.32 5.38 -0.06 0.60
Number of children 6 years old or younger 1,479         0.19 0.20 -0.01 0.72
Number of children 18 years old or younger 1,479         1.67 1.72 -0.05 0.49
Age of household head (Years) 1,470         49.82 49.37 0.45 0.49
Highest level of schooling completed by household head (Years) 1,479         3.62 3.77 -0.15 0.54
Household head is unschooled (1 = "Yes") 1,479         0.56 0.54 0.02 0.32
Household head able to read (1 = "Yes") 1,479         0.42 0.44 -0.02 0.37
Household head able to write (1 = "Yes") 1,479         0.38 0.41 -0.03 0.25
B. Savings and Credit
Total amount of savings, all sources (Rs.) 1,479         22,092.54 20,606.70 1,485.84 0.33
   Amount of savings with bank or post office  (Rs.) 1,479         1,735.26 1,413.18 322.08 0.27
   Amount of savings in cash at home  (Rs.) 1,479         1,831.83 1,596.73 235.10 0.16
   Amount of savings in jewelry  (Rs.) 1,479         13,274.70 13,396.47 -121.77 0.91
   Amount of savings with SHG or other group  (Rs.) 1,479         2,185.75 2,117.36 68.39 0.79
   Amount of other savings  (Rs.) 1,479         3,065.01 2,082.97 982.04 0.10 *
Total amount of credit owed, all sources (Rs.) 1,479         41,319.89 41,972.02 -652.13 0.80
   Amount of credit from bank  (Rs.) 1,479         21,168.34 19,652.26 1,516.08 0.36
   Amount of credit from family and friends  (Rs.) 1,479         6,810.36 5,998.17 812.19 0.42
   Amount of credit from MFIs  (Rs.) 1,479         557.87 827.45 -269.58 0.16
   Amount of credit from moneylenders  (Rs.) 1,479         11,504.71 14,000.27 -2,495.56 0.12
   Amount of credit from other sources of credit  (Rs.) 1,479         1,278.60 1,493.89 -215.29 0.42
C. Livestock and other Assets  (as of June 2009)
Number of large animals owned, i.e. buffalos, cows and oxen 1,479         2.22 2.29 -0.07 0.64
Number of small animals owned, i.e. goats, sheep, chicken, pigs 1,479         4.70 5.77 -1.07 0.36
Total market value of livestock owned (Rs.) 1,479         31,921.99 36,626.48 -4,704.49 0.12
House type: strong structure (1 = "Yes") 1,479         0.54 0.55 -0.01 0.65
House type: semi-strong structure (1 = "Yes") 1,479         0.33 0.32 0.01 0.67
House type: weak structure (1 = "Yes") 1,479         0.13 0.12 0.01 0.81
Number or rooms in the house 1,479         2.62 2.65 -0.03 0.72
Estimated value of the house if owned  (Rs.) 1,479         116,938.10 117,345.52 -407.42 0.96Appendix Tabel A1: Sample Balancing - Panel B
Variable N
Treatment 
Mean
Control 
Mean Difference
Robust p-
value
Significance 
Level
C. Livestock and other Assets  (as of June 2009) contd.
Total area of agricultural land (Acres) 1,479         5.44 5.29 0.15 0.59
Estimated value of agricultural land  (Rs.) 1,479         558,433.69 457,886.75 100,546.94 0.19
Estimated value of non-agricultural land and other houses  (Rs.) 1,479         6,677.00 10,614.82 -3,937.82 0.13
D. Agricultural Investments
Total cultivated land (acres) - all crops during Kharif'08 1,479         4.38 4.24 0.14 0.50
Total cultivated land (acres) - cash crops during Kharif'08 1,479         3.48 3.32 0.16 0.27
Any land planted - cash crops during Kharif'08 (1 = Yes) 1,479         0.92 0.92 0.00 0.66
Total amount spent on inputs - all crops during Kharif'08 1,479         20,036.09 20,114.60 -78.51 0.94
Amount spent on hybrid seeds - all crops during Kharif'08 1,479         853.28 844.28 9.00 0.94
Amount spent on improved seeds - all crops during Kharif'08 1,479         4,374.40 4,355.82 18.58 0.96
Amount spent on fertilizer - all crops during Kharif'08 1,479         3,286.97 3,266.50 20.47 0.92
Amount spent on manure - all crops  during Kharif'08 1,479         2,073.28 2,339.35 -266.07 0.10
Amount spent on irrigation - all crops during Kharif'08 1,479         119.64 181.66 -62.02 0.18
Amount spent on hiring tractor/other impl - all crops during Kharif'08 1,479         2,722.60 2,634.53 88.07 0.64
Amount spent on manual labor - all crops during Kharif'08 1,479         5,027.87 4,895.52 132.35 0.63
Amount spent on bullock labor - all crops during Kharif'08 1,479         1,578.04 1,596.94 -18.90 0.88
Total amount spent on inputs - cash crops during Kharif'08 1,479         15,868.37 15,922.89 -54.52 0.94
Amount spent on hybrid seeds - cash crops during Kharif'08 1,479         454.99 427.08 27.91 0.61
Amount spent on improved seeds - cash crops during Kharif'08 1,479         4,011.70 3,969.40 42.30 0.89
Amount spent on fertilizer - cash crops during Kharif'08 1,479         2,283.97 2,301.64 -17.67 0.88
Amount spent on manure - cash crops  during Kharif'08 1,479         1,753.77 1,928.40 -174.63 0.24
Amount spent on irrigation - cash crops during Kharif'08 1,479         22.53 40.23 -17.70 0.29
Amount spent on hiring tractor/other impl - cash crops during Kharif'08 1,479         2,083.15 1,960.07 123.08 0.28
Amount spent on manual labor - cash crops during Kharif'08 1,479         3,865.88 3,884.43 -18.55 0.93
Amount spent on bullock labor - cash crops during Kharif'08 1,479         1,392.37 1,411.64 -19.27 0.86
The table reports a randomization test run on the baseline sample, where each variable is tested for treatment assignment OLS estimation,
robust standard errors. Symbols *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.Appendix: Definitions of variables used
Variable Description
Household size
Number of children 6 years old or younger
Number of children 18 years old or younger
Age of household head Years
Highest level of schooling completed by household head  Years
Household head is unschooled  Dummy (1 = "Yes")
Household head able to read  Dummy (1 = "Yes")
Household head able to write  Dummy (1 = "Yes")
Number of large animals owned, i.e. buffalos, cows and oxen
Number of small animals owned, i.e. goats, sheep, chicken, pigs
Total market value of livestock owned  Indian Rupees
Total amount of savings, all sources  Indian Rupees
   Amount of savings with bank or post office   Indian Rupees
   Amount of savings in cash at home   Indian Rupees
   Amount of savings in jewelry   Indian Rupees
   Amount of savings with SHG or other group   Indian Rupees
   Amount of other savings   Indian Rupees
Total amount of credit owed, all sources  Indian Rupees
   Amount of credit from bank   Indian Rupees
   Amount of credit from family and friends   Indian Rupees
   Amount of credit from MFIs   Indian Rupees
   Amount of credit from moneylenders   Indian Rupees
   Amount of credit from other sources of credit   Indian Rupees
House type: strong structure  Dummy (1 = "Yes")
House type: semi-strong structure  Dummy (1 = "Yes")
House type: weak structure  Dummy (1 = "Yes")
Number or rooms in the house
Estimated value of the house if owned   Indian Rupees
Total area of agricultural land owned Acres
Estimated value of agricultural land   Indian Rupees
Estimated value of non-agricultural land and other houses   Indian Rupees
Total cultivated land - all crops during Kharif'09 Dummy (1 = if >0)
Total cultivated land - all crops during Kharif'09
In which Kartis did farmer plant?  - all crops during Kharif'09
Total cultivated land - cash crops during Kharif'09 Dummy (1 = if >0)
Total cultivated land - cash crops during Kharif'09
In which Kartis did farmer plant? - cash crops during Kharif'09
Did farmer replant crop this Kharif? - cash crops during Kharif'09 Dummy (1 = "Yes")
Did farmer abandon crop this Kharif? - cash crops during Kharif'09 Dummy (1 = "Yes")
Total amount spent on inputs - all crops (excl. pesticides) during Kharif'09 Indian Rupees
Total amount spent on inputs - all crops during Kharif'09 Indian Rupees
Amount spent on hybrid seeds - all crops during Kharif'09 Indian Rupees
Amount spent on improved seeds - all crops during Kharif'09 Indian Rupees
Amount spent on fertilizer - all crops during Kharif'09 Indian Rupees
Amount spent on manure - all crops  during Kharif'09 Indian Rupees
Amount spent on pesticide - all crops  during Kharif'09 Indian Rupees
Amount spent on irrigation - all crops during Kharif'09 Indian Rupees
Amount spent on hiring tractor/other impl - all crops during Kharif'09 Indian Rupees
Amount spent on manual labor - all crops during Kharif'09 Indian Rupees
Amount spent on bullock labor - all crops during Kharif'09 Indian Rupees
Total market value used for all crops during Kharif'09 Indian Rupees
Total market value used for all crops during Kharif'09, inputs 1-5 Indian Rupees
Total market value used for all crops during Kharif'09, inputs 1-5 Dummy (1 = if >0)
Market value used of hybrid seeds - all crops during Kharif'09 Indian Rupees
Market value used of improved seeds - all crops during Kharif'09 Indian Rupees
Market value used of fertilizer - all crops during Kharif'09 Indian Rupees
Market value used of manure - all crops  during Kharif'09 Indian Rupees
Market value used of pesticide - all crops  during Kharif'09 Indian Rupees
Market value used of irrigation - all crops during Kharif'09 Indian Rupees
Market value used of hiring tractor/other impl - all crops during Kharif'09 Indian Rupees
Market value used of manual labor - all crops during Kharif'09 Indian Rupees
Market value used of bullock labor - all crops during Kharif'09 Indian Rupees
Total market value used for cash crops during Kharif'09 Indian Rupees
Total market value used for cash crops during Kharif'09, inputs 1-5 Dummy (1 = if >0)
Market value used of hybrid seeds - cash crops during Kharif'09 Indian Rupees
Market value used of improved seeds - cash crops during Kharif'09 Indian Rupees
Market value used of fertilizer - cash crops during Kharif'09 Indian Rupees
Market value used of manure - cash crops during Kharif'09 Indian Rupees
Market value used of pesticide - cash crops during Kharif'09 Indian Rupees
Market value used of hybrid seeds - cash crops during Kharif'09 Dummy = 1 if > 0
Market value used of improved seeds - cash crops during Kharif'09 Dummy = 1 if > 0
Market value used of fertilizer - cash crops during Kharif'09 Dummy = 1 if > 0
Market value used of manure - cash crops during Kharif'09 Dummy = 1 if > 0
Market value used of pesticide - cash crops during Kharif'09 Dummy = 1 if > 0
Total cultivated land - all crops during Kharif'08 Acres
Total cultivated land - cash crops during Kharif'08 Acres
Any land planted - cash crops during Kharif'08  Dummy (1 = "Yes")
Total amount spent on inputs - all crops during Kharif'08 Indian Rupees
Amount spent on hybrid seeds - all crops during Kharif'08 Indian Rupees
Amount spent on improved seeds - all crops during Kharif'08 Indian Rupees
Amount spent on fertilizer - all crops during Kharif'08 Indian Rupees
Amount spent on manure - all crops  during Kharif'08 Indian Rupees
Amount spent on irrigation - all crops during Kharif'08 Indian Rupees
Amount spent on hiring tractor/other impl - all crops during Kharif'08 Indian Rupees
Amount spent on manual labor - all crops during Kharif'08 Indian Rupees
Amount spent on bullock labor - all crops during Kharif'08 Indian RupeesAppendix: Definitions of variables used, continued
Variable Description
Total amount spent on inputs - cash crops during Kharif'08 Indian Rupees
Amount spent on hybrid seeds - cash crops during Kharif'08 Indian Rupees
Amount spent on improved seeds - cash crops during Kharif'08 Indian Rupees
Amount spent on fertilizer - cash crops during Kharif'08 Indian Rupees
Amount spent on manure - cash crops  during Kharif'08 Indian Rupees
Amount spent on irrigation - cash crops during Kharif'08 Indian Rupees
Amount spent on hiring tractor/other impl - cash crops during Kharif'08 Indian Rupees
Amount spent on manual labor - cash crops during Kharif'08 Indian Rupees
Amount spent on bullock labor - cash crops during Kharif'08 Indian Rupees
Treatment  Dummy (1 = "Yes")
Fertilizer Treatment  Dummy (1 = "Yes")
Log of number of years of schooling of household head Log (1+ yrs. of schooling of HH)
Log of total area of agricultural land owned (Acres) Log (1+ acres of agric. Land owned))
Wealth index: principal component
First component of PCA. Variables includes a dummy if the household owns a specific 
type of livestock, the log of the total value of livestock, a dummy if the household has 
any type of credit, a dummy if the household has any type of savings, the log of  total 
amount of savings and credit, the house type, the number of rooms in the house, the total 
area of agricultural land, the log of the house value, the log of the land value, and the log 
of the value of other assets. 
St. dev. of expected yield (kg/acre) of cash crops without fertilizer Each respondent reports minimum, maximum, mean and intermediate values (I and III 
quartiles) yield, given a set of assumptions. Calculate standard deviation
Insurance Knowledge Index
Assign one point per 'good' response to five questions that ask individuals to calculate if 
they would get a payout and how large that payout would be, given a set of assumptions. 
Insurance Knowledge Index is the sum of this score [0-5]
Ever heard of rainfall insurance  Dummy (1 = "Yes")
Interaction term between Treatment and Wealth Index Treatment * Wealth Index
Interaction term between Treatment and Tot amount of agricultural land owned Treatment * log(1 + agricultural land owned)
Interaction term between Treatment and  Household head can read Treatment * Household head can read
Interaction term between Treatment and log of years of schooling Treatment * log(1 + years of schooling)
Interaction term between Treatment and St. dev. of expected yield  Treatment * St. dev. of expected yield
Interaction term between Treatment and Insurance Knowledge Index Treatment * Insurance Knowledge Index
Interaction term between Treatment and Ever heard of rainfall insurance  Treatment * Ever heard of rainfall insurance
All bids, if Phase I = 1 Indian Rupees
All bids, if Phase II = 1 Indian Rupees
All bids Indian Rupees
Bid: Actual policy Indian Rupees
Bid: Policy more likely to pay maximum amount (exit Indian Rupees
Bid: Policy pays less per mm shortfall (mm) Indian Rupees
Bid: Policy from distant rainfall station (basis risk) Indian Rupees
Policy pays less per mm of deviation (mm) Dummy (1 = "Yes")
More likely policy pays maximum amount (exit Dummy (1 = "Yes")
Policy is from a distant rainfall station (basis risk) Dummy (1 = "Yes")
Phase 2 Policy   Dummy (1 = "Yes")
New Participants  Dummy (1 = Individuals not in the original sample)
Policy Ordering 2  Dummy (1 = Ordering 2)
Quartile II Income Distribution   Dummy (1 = "Yes")
Quartile III Income Distribution   Dummy (1 = "Yes")
Quartile IV Income Distribution   Dummy (1 = "Yes")
Interaction term between Income and More likely policy pays maximum amount (exit) Income * Exit
Interaction term between Income and Policy pays less per mm shortfall (mm Income * mm
Interaction term between Income and Policy is from a distant rainfall station (basis risk Income * Basis Risk
Quartile II Schooling   Dummy (1 = "Yes")
Quartile III Schooling   Dummy (1 = "Yes")
Quartile IV Schooling   Dummy (1 = "Yes")
Interaction term between Schooling and More likely policy pays maximum amount (exit) Schooling * Exit
Interaction term between Schooling and Policy pays less per mm shortfall (mm Schooling * mm
Interaction term between Schooling and Policy is from a distant rainfall station (basis risk Schooling * basis risk
Quartile II Financial Sophistication 
Dummy (1 = "Yes"). The financial sophistication index is the aggregate score on three 
questions: self reported financial sophistication, self reported experience with insurance 
and self-reported ability to evaluate insurance
Quartile III Financial Sophistication
Dummy (1 = "Yes"). The financial sophistication index is the aggregate score on three 
questions: self reported financial sophistication, self reported experience with insurance 
and self-reported ability to evaluate insurance
Quartile IV Financial Sophistication
Dummy (1 = "Yes"). The financial sophistication index is the aggregate score on three 
questions: self reported financial sophistication, self reported experience with insurance 
and self-reported ability to evaluate insurance
Interaction term between Financial Sophistication and More likely policy pays maximum amount (exit) Financial Sophistication * exit
Interaction term between Financial Sophistication and Policy pays less per mm shortfall (mm Financial Sophistication * mm
Interaction term between Financial Sophistication and Policy is from a distant rainfall station (basis risk Financial Sophistication * basis risk